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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper investigates whether stock markets react any differently to financial statement 
restatement information after the events of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The research in 
this paper is trying to demonstrate that financial markets reacted negatively to restatement 
information following the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, ascertain if markets reacted 
less negatively to post-financial crisis restatements than post-Sarbanes Oxley restatements, and 
determine whether markets reacted more negatively to restatements of core earnings following 
the financial crisis period. Little research surrounding the market effects of the financial crisis 
exist, and it was necessary to further study the effects of restatement information on financial 
markets, due to its continued importance and relevance. While the impact of restatement 
information has been studied over previous time periods, primarily surrounding the 
implementation of Sarbanes Oxley in 2002, it was important to see if the general public placed 
any additional emphasis on, or displayed any greater awareness of the implications of, a 
financial statement restatement after the events of the Financial Crisis of 2008.  
 To investigate this issue, stock price information was collected for a period of time 
surrounding restatement filing dates for a small sample of companies within two time periods: 
Post-SOX and Post-Dodd Frank. Analyzing differences in percent changes in stock price 
between the two samples would allow one to develop conclusions on whether a restatement 
elicited a stronger or weaker market reaction. A regression model was then used to analyze 
potential variables within the stock price movement that may have influenced the overall 
outcome. The primary goal was to determine a degree of correlation between various 
independent variables and percent changes in stock price surrounding restatement filings for the 
two samples.  
 The findings presented some expected results, but some less promising outcomes as well. 
The analysis of cumulative percentage change in stock price showed that markets reacted 
negatively to restatement filings after the events leading to the Financial Crisis. Additionally, 
markets reacted more strongly to restatement information in the Post-Dodd Frank sample, which 
is contrary to the initial hypothesis, but only by a small margin. Aside from the number of days 
covered within a restatement period, the regression model failed to provide any statistically 
significant variables, and the model overall did not achieve statistical significance. The variables 
selected accounted for roughly 39% of the movement in stock price within the 2005-2007 (Post-
SOX) sample, and only about 8% for the 2011-2013 (Post-Dodd Frank) sample. This lack of 
correlation can be attributed to a number of potential factors; among them the small sample size, 
the lack of consideration for other variables, and the use of cumulative changes in a stock’s 
price instead of cumulative abnormal returns, which factors for changes in market prices 
relative to changes in individual security prices.  
 It’s difficult to conclude with certainty what the implications of the research are. While 
the data collected portrays a stronger market reaction to restatements in the post-financial crisis 
period, the regression model cannot accurately portray the reasoning behind this movement, and 
even contradicts conventional sequences of thought at times. In a perfect world, one would like 
to see financial markets displaying a greater understanding of restatement implications, and a 
stronger awareness of how such information can be identified.  Future researchers expanding on 
this topic should drastically increase the sample size, take cumulative abnormal returns into 
account, and to account for more variables in the data.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the effects of financial statement restatements on 
market returns. Specifically, the paper examines the results of restatements that have occurred 
since the 2008 Financial Crisis and compares them with post-SOX restatements to determine if 
an increased public awareness or emphasis on the implication of a restatement in financial 
markets exists. The events of the 2008 recession caused political unrest, and created economic 
deterrence throughout the globe. As a result, the publics’ waning trust in free markets heralded a 
new age of increased scrutiny and regulation in the United States. With heightened pressure on 
auditors to provide fair and accurate information in this period of economic instability and 
corporate mistrust, it was appropriate to study any effects that this increased regulation and 
financial market reform may have caused for the accounting field. Most notably, the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act comes to mind. Proposed in 2009 and enacted 
into law in 2010, the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was “to promote the financial stability of 
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
"too big to fail", to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”1 It’s important to note that this law 
is primarily focused at regulating Wall Street and investment risk, not necessarily auditors and 
the accounting profession. A similar statement can be made regarding the Volker Rule, a 
subsection in the Dodd-Frank Act which limited the amount of risky investments a company 
could hold in its portfolio. While these regulations did not specifically target auditing, like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 did, it’s clear that the general public and the government alike are 
                                                          
1
 This is the official “Long title” of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
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placing increased emphasis on risk aversion, fraud awareness, and crisis prevention. It’s in this 
vein that the research in this paper seeks to determine whether the public and the financial 
markets place greater emphasis, or convey any further understanding, on financial statement 
restatements following the Great Recession.  
 A financial statement restatement can be defined as the revision and publication 
of one or more of a company's previous financial statements. This generally occurs when it’s 
determined that a statement contains a material inaccuracy after its public release. A restatement 
can arise for any number of reasons, but can generally be categorized under the two umbrellas of 
unintentional error or fraudulent/improper earnings management. Evidence from previous 
research suggests that restatements almost always reduce income, indicating that the cause for 
most restatements generally arise in connection with the latter category (Wilson, 2008). It’s for 
this reason that the analysis of market reaction to financial statement restatements is so 
compelling given recent economic events. Results of this analysis should help determine whether 
the public has significant awareness and understanding of the implications of financial statement 
restatements. Financial statements act as a basis for myriad investors on past performance and 
future earnings potential. Financial markets rely on the accuracy and reliability of the 
information provided in these statements, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act aimed to achieve such 
reliability. And while investor confidence did improve after the implementation of SOX, 
financial statement restatements continue to be highly numerous and problematic. It’s important 
to determine if, given the events leading to the 2008 Financial Crisis, the financial markets are 
reacting as strongly as they should to an indication that fraudulent or incorrect information has 
been reported.  
 
3 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 The Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 has been considered by many to be the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression. It resulted in economic instability throughout the globe, the 
government bailout of large banks, and a significant downturn in both stock and housing 
markets. There are many underlying causes for the Financial Crisis, but The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission, in an official document titled the Final Report of the National Commission 
on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, asserted that the crisis 
was caused, among other factors, by "widespread failures in financial regulation and 
supervision," "dramatic failures of corporate governance and risk management at many 
systemically important financial institutions," "a combination of excessive borrowing, risky 
investments, and lack of transparency", the "systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics," 
"collapsing mortgage-lending standards and the mortgage securitization pipeline," and "the 
failures of credit rating agencies" to correctly price risk. Only some of these factors may be 
tangentially related to the accounting or auditing profession, unlike the accounting scandals 
leading to the creation of SOX in 2002. However, one factor does remain constant between these 
two events: a general breakdown of trust in financial markets, corporations, and the regulators 
who failed to prevent or detect such pervasive issues.  
This examination will, in part, attempt to expand upon an existing body of research which 
analyzes the market impact of financial statement restatements before, during, and after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act implementation period. In many ways, the approach will be similar; the 
regression model is based heavily on previous regression models used to analyze market 
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reactions of restatements before and after SOX. The transfer of this model from the SOX 
implementation period to the Dodd-Frank implementation period should yield some interesting 
and varying results, which will be expanded upon in the hypotheses.  
 The primary source on which the regression analysis is based is Market Reaction to 
Restatements After Sarbanes-Oxley (Sierra et al, 2012). The focus of this paper was to determine 
if the market reacted differently to restatements during the initial implementation of SOX than it 
did subsequently. As per Sierra, Lovata, and Jategaonkar, “SOX was designed to boost investor 
confidence in corporate reporting. Restatements increased after the passage of SOX, and it has 
been suggested that this is evidence of the effectiveness of the Act, since this was the first time 
companies were systematically evaluating and being held accountable for the effectiveness of 
internal controls. Because this was a change for all companies, it was believed that the disclosure 
of material weaknesses and restatements would be common during the initial implementation of 
SOX” (2012). Following this logic, the paper tests the hypothesis that the market actually reacted 
less severely to restatements in the months immediately surrounding the implementation of SOX, 
as the increasing number of restatements served as a positive sign that the Act was an effective 
tool in improving reliability in financial reporting, and companies needed time to adapt to new 
rules and accounting guidelines. The paper therefore seeks to test the hypothesis that “companies 
received a “bye” in the two years immediately following Sarbanes-Oxley implementation. 
Between the positive impacts that could be attributed to companies looking at their processes 
more thoroughly, and the learning curve for management, auditors, and investors, we 
hypothesize that the market reaction to restatements during the implementation period will be 
less than during the post-implementation period” (Sierra et al, 2012). A sample of 3,471 
restatements yielded the following simplified results: 
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Means of CARs 
  N MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
All Observations 3,471 -0.01453 0.10632 -0.95179 1.46444 
Implementation 644 -0.0092 0.12465 -0.51419 1.35821 
Post-Implementation 2,827 -0.01575 0.10167 -0.95179 1.46444 
 
The analysis shows that cumulative abnormal returns are less negative for implementation 
restatements than post-implementation restatements. This approach of analyzing movements in 
stock price before and after a particular event is crucial for what is trying to be accomplished in 
this paper, and therefore acts as an important foundation for current and future accounting 
literature.  
 Implications of Financial Statement Restatements of Different Items by Katsiaryna 
Salavei offers some insight on how market reaction can be affected by the nature of the 
restatement itself. A stock, as the research indicates, will experience significantly more negative 
CARs when the restatement results from an easy-to-estimate account, versus a difficult-to-
estimate account. The implication is that restatements from easy-to-estimate accounts, such as 
revenue recognition and cost and expense accounts, likely resulted from either an intentional 
misrepresentation or poor internal controls within an organization. Comparatively, difficult-to-
estimate accounts related to restructuring or M&A will experience restatement reactions with 
less negative returns, as per the regression analysis available in the research paper. Table 3 
within Salavei’s paper recognizes the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns by reason. The 
total sample of 788 restatements ranging from a 1997-2002 announcement yield a CAR mean of 
-7.88%. The table also illustrates that accounts deemed easy-to-estimate experience more 
negative CARs (revenue recognition -8.24% mean with revenue recognition restatements 
accounting for over 33% of total restatements during this time, cost or expense -7.05% mean) 
than difficult-to-estimate accounts (reclassification -3.76% mean, related party transactions -
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2.81% mean). All of these values are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The research 
offered by Salavei offers two important considerations: investors tend to be sophisticated and 
understand the nature of restatements, and there are various factors that influence the degree of 
stock market volatility with regards to financial statement restatements. It’s with these two 
frames of reference that the research for this paper is approached.  
 It’s surprising that a significant quantity of research relating to market reactions in the 
post-Great Recession period cannot be found. Some articles offer insight regarding strategic 
challenges in an increasingly regulated business environment; for example, Smith and Muniz-
Fraticelli in their paper Strategic Shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act indicate that the general 
public is concerned “due to the awareness that financial problems are costs that are passed on to 
shareholders, either directly in the form of capital losses or indirectly in the form of overall 
market instability...Market instability has adversely affected the competitiveness of U.S. 
markets” (2013).  But substantial mathematical analysis on how (if, at all) the markets have 
changed underlying habits and assumptions does not yet exist. There is no support that the 
financial markets are reacting differently in a statistically significant manner to indications of 
corporate fraud or lack of oversight, after such events helped cause the U.S. economy to tumble 
in the first place. It’s unclear how to interpret the fact that a large body of data regarding this 
matter does not yet exist, especially since countless mathematical analyses can be found on the 
Sarbanes-Oxley era of regulation. Some of this difference can be attributed to the notion that 
SOX was a direct response to accounting issues, whereas the Dodd-Frank Act targeted primarily 
Wall Street and various financial banking institutions. Perhaps there is no indication that the 
financial crisis and resulting Dodd-Frank Act would have any direct effect on accounting-related 
matters, which is in part what this paper will be testing. Timing could also play a factor, as many 
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papers have been published in the past few years regarding SOX, which was enacted in 2002. 
However, mathematical papers referencing SOX have also been published between 2002 and 
2005, and at this point it is surprising that more analysis on the post-financial crisis capital 
markets does not yet exist.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
 The following are the hypotheses that will be tested through statistical analysis. 
 
H1: Markets reacted negatively to financial statement restatements after The Global Financial 
Crisis and the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. 
 
 The purpose of testing this hypothesis is to determine whether the general public 
maintained any awareness of what financial statement restatements are, or if the markets placed 
further emphasis on the potential implications of restatements after the fallout of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis and the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, by examining changes in 
stock prices surrounding restatement announcements. The hypothesis is based on the assumption 
that post-financial crisis markets would continue to react to restatements with scrutiny, and any 
indication of possible fraud within an organization would be met with adverse market affects. If 
this hypothesis cannot be shown to be statistically significant, it may indicate that the general 
public does not attribute the cause of the financial crisis with any accounting issue, and most 
concentration remains focused on banks and Wall Street. It might also indicate that the general 
public is not well enough informed about restatement implications, or how restatements may be 
identified.  
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H2: Markets reacted less significantly to post-financial crisis restatements than to post-Sarbanes 
Oxley restatements. 
 
While negative stock return effects for post-financial crisis restatements are expected, they 
should not be more negative than post-Sarbanes Oxley restatements. In a perfect world, the 
business environment would see greater market reaction to restatements and other indications of 
fraud or poor internal controls as time progresses and more market scandals occur. However, it’s 
anticipated that the nature of the financial crisis heralded less attention to financial statement 
restatements than Sarbanes-Oxley did. Results of this analysis will indicate the public’s 
perception of how much they considered accounting issues to play a significant role in the events 
leading to the financial crisis. If more negative results for post-financial crisis restatements are 
not found which are shown to be statistically significant, it may suggest that trust in all business-
related occupations and fields have been diminished, or that the public knows more about 
restatement implications than they did in the years following Sarbanes-Oxley.  
 
H3: Market returns for restatements of core earnings will be more negative than restatements 
not related to revenue recognition or operating expenses in the post-financial crisis period.  
 
This analysis is primarily a direct transfer from the Sierra, Lovata, and Jategaonkar paper Market 
Reaction to Restatements after Sarbanes-Oxley. The paper determined that restatements of core 
earnings are viewed more negatively than non-core restatements, which indicated that the 
markets placed more emphasis on revenue-and-expense related restatements above all others. 
This makes sense considering the ease with which management can manipulate core earnings, 
and the incentive that exists for management to manipulate these earnings in order to meet EPS 
and various other estimates.  H3 for this paper will simply determine whether this same emphasis 
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exists after the events of the Great Recession, or if markets are starting to treat all restatements 
similarly.  
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE 
 
 Information relevant to financial statement restatements was acquired through Audit 
Analytics. Thousands of restatements were found for both time periods under analysis, which are 
2005-2007 for the post-SOX and pre-Financial Crisis sample, and 2011-2013 for the post-
Financial Crisis sample. However, in the interest of maintaining an understanding at an 
appropriate level, only the 50 restatement instances in both time periods for companies with the 
highest net assets were selected. Larger companies are more likely to make a stronger impact in 
the stock market, and their market reactions may be easier to read and slightly more predictable 
than companies which might receive less media exposure or attention.  The list of data from AA 
was combined with CRSP to obtain change information related to stock price, analyzing stock 
price movement from 1 day before the restatement filing to 2 days after the filing. This range of 
time was selected for two reasons. First, the assumption is that any movement prior to one day 
before the restatement filing is irrelevant. On the date of the filing, a negative change in stock 
price between the filing date and the previous day should realistically be measured. Second, the 
analysis is extended to two days after the filing date in order to identify post-announcement drift 
trends. A stock that appreciates in overall value between -1 and +2 might indicate that the market 
regards restatements very lowly and is quickly forgotten and ignored by investors, even if 
negative market returns are experienced on day 0.  
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VARIABLES 
 
 The dependent variable is the percentage change in stock price between days -1 and +2 of 
the restatement filing date. Changes will be estimated for the restatement disclosure date, minus 
two and plus one trading days. As stated previously, consideration for most independent 
variables in the regression model have been extrapolated from Sierra, Lovata, and Jategaonkar 
(2012), whose regression model has already done a considerably good job of analyzing market 
reactions to financial statement restatements surrounding Sarbanes-Oxley.  
 
Restatement Variables 
 
Sierra, Lovata, and Jategaonkar (2012) illustrate the many potential sources of 
restatement impact on market returns. Information for all variables was acquired through Audit 
Analytics, which generally offers extensive data relating to financial statement restatements. 
Audit Analytics offered information regarding fraud. If fraudulent activity is a reason behind the 
restatement, FRAUD is coded as 1 (dummy variable). Audit Analytics also indicates the account 
affected by the fraudulent activity. Particularly important for H3, Audit Analytics includes 
information regarding the nature of the restatement and accounts affected for all non-FRAUD 
restatements as well. If the data indicates that the restatement was a revenue recognition, cost of 
goods sold, or other operating expense issue, this restatement will be considered a CORE 
restatement, and this instance would be coded as 1. Consideration is also given to the 
pervasiveness of restatements during a period of time. It’s expected that an indication of a 
restatement that affects, say, 5 different accounts, would elicit a stronger market reaction than an 
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indication of 1 or 2 affected accounts. Audit Analytics includes number of restatement 
categories, and for this the variable NUMFAIL is included.  
 The overall impact of the restatement should also be taken into consideration. If a 
restatement resulted in a positive change on a company’s financial statements, Audit Analytics 
includes a 1 for Res Improves. For the model, the information will be reversed and the positive 
change data will be separated from the negative change data. NEG will be coded 1 if a 
restatement results in a negative financial statement impact.  
 The length of time over which the restatement exists might also be a determinant of 
market impact. The market might place more of an emphasis on a restatement of earnings that 
covers a period of several years, over a restatement of one quarters’ earnings. To account for 
this, the end of the restatement period will be subtracted from the beginning of the restatement 
period. This will yield the number of days in the restatement period, which is accounted for as 
RESTDAYS. Also included is a variable which indicates if the restatement was a result of an 
SEC investigation. Audit Analytics includes a dummy variable for the variable SEC, providing a 
1 if the restatement involved such an investigation.  
 
Control Variables 
 
 The conscious decision has been made to skew the data set toward samples with the 
largest net assets. The assumption here is that company size is often related to market returns, 
and it was important to capture a sample that would show the largest market movement and 
impact. The size variable ASSETS is the natural log of total assets. The dummy variable 
EXCHANGE is also being used to indicate if the restating company is actively traded on either 
the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ. The fact that a company is traded on a public 
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exchange possesses implications regarding the openness and transferability of information to 
investors. Instances of restatements of companies listed on these exchanges are coded as 1, and it 
would be interesting to see how patterns of private and public company restatements have 
changed between the two time periods. However, for the purpose of analyzing changes in market 
returns, the EXCHANGE variable had to be removed from the regression itself, as no security 
information is available through CRSP for private corporations.  
 While these variables borrow from the model constructed by Seirra, Lovata, and 
Jategaonkar, it was decided to remove some variables for the analysis. For example, Sierra, et al. 
includes variables for backdating and leasing issues that arose primarily due to changes in 
reporting regulations enforced by Sarbanes-Oxley. The assumption for the 2011-2013 sample is 
that these reporting issues have been alleviated, and would have no statistically significant 
impact on market reaction.  
 
THE MODEL 
 
 The ordinary least squares regression model tested is: 
% Change = α + β1FRAUD + β2CORE + β3NEG + β4NUMFAIL + β5RESTDAYS +   
β6SEC + β7ASSETS + β8EXCHANGE + ε 
Where: 
% Change = the sum of cumulative percent changes in stock price from -1 trading day to +2 
trading days around the filing date of the restatement. 
FRAUD = 1 if fraud was present; otherwise, zero. 
CORE = 1 if it was a core restatement; otherwise, zero. 
NEG = 1 if there was a negative earnings impact; otherwise, zero. 
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NUMFAIL = the number of reporting issues requiring restatements. 
RESTDAYS = the number of days in the restatement period. 
SEC = 1 if there was an SEC investigation; otherwise, zero. 
ASSETS = the natural log of assets. 
EXCHANGE = 1 if the company’s stock was being traded on the NYSE or NASDAQ; 
otherwise, zero. 
 
 The regression model will be run twice; once for the post-SOX/pre-financial crisis period 
(2005-2007), and once for the post-financial crisis period (2011-2013). Similar to Sierra et al.’s 
approach, interaction variables will then be included for each of the two periods so that 
significant differences can be identified and analyzed. Restatements in the post-financial crisis 
period will be coded with a 1 in order to account for these differences in interaction variables. 
This dummy variable will be multiplied by each of the independent variables. As explained by 
the Sierra et al. model, the coefficients’ significance level would indicate the strength of a 
change in market reaction between the two time periods.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 Table 1 illustrates the arithmetic means of the independent variables used in the 
regression model, including EXCHANGE. This analysis allows one to quickly identify the 
various differences between the two samples without getting too in-depth. This therefore is not 
the most statistically relevant basis of analysis, but it does provide some rudimentary insight. For 
example, exactly one restatement relating to fraud existed in both time periods sampled. Given 
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the small sample size it’s difficult to ascertain any implications from this, but more restatements 
related to fraud would have been expected to exist in both time periods. The Probability of T-
Test column identifies the four independent variables with statistically significant differences 
between the two sampled periods: NUMFAIL, RESTDAYS, SEC, and ASSETS. Considerably 
more restatements from the Post-SOX sample were the result of an SEC statement, and the Post-
Dodd Frank sample only possessed one restatement related to an SEC investigation. The 
independent variable with the largest differences is RESTDAYS, which makes sense, 
considering the many accounting rules that Sarbanes-Oxley modified, which would force 
companies to retrospectively restate earnings over a longer period of time; in the case of the 
Post-SOX sample, 1236 days, or 3.4 years. However, it was still surprising to see an average 
restatement coverage length of over 594 days for the Post-Dodd Frank sample. While reduced by 
more than half since 2005-2007, this extended period of time might indicate that auditors, both 
internal and external, are not doing enough to ensure accurate disclosure in a timely manner.  
Table 1: Means of Independent Variables & T-Tests 
All Observations Post-SOX Post-Dodd Frank 
N 100 50 50 
Variable MEAN STD MEAN STD MEAN STD Prob of T-Test 
FRAUD 0.0200 0.1414 0.0200 0.1414 0.0200 0.1414 0.846 
CORE 0.2500 0.4373 0.2400 0.4314 0.2600 0.4431 0.820 
NEG 0.8500 0.3582 0.8200 0.3881 0.8800 0.3283 0.406 
NUMFAIL 2.3000 2.2320 2.7000 2.6206 1.9000 1.8434 0.081 
RESTDAYS 915.7000 587.3907 1236.9000 761.6405 594.5000 413.1409 0.000 
SEC 0.1000 0.2648 0.1800 0.3881 0.0200 0.1414 0.007 
ASSETS 25.9370 1.0313 26.3997 1.0423 25.4742 1.0202 0.000 
EXCHANGE 0.6900 0.4640 0.6400 0.4849 0.7400 0.4431 0.284 
The bolded values indicate a statistically significant difference between the Post-SOX and Post-Dodd 
Frank periods at the 10% level. 
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 Table 2 lists the cumulative percent change in stock price surrounding restatement filings 
for each security identified in the samples. The results were admittedly very surprising and 
underwhelming. Between -1 and +2 days of the restatement filing, the total percent changes in 
market prices were only .38% and 2.3% for the Post-SOX and Post-Dodd Frank samples, 
respectively. There are several potential reasons for this virtually nonexistent market response to 
restatement filings. First, the restatement filing date may not be the best metric for analyzing 
market reaction. While it should elicit a strong market reaction, it’s possible that investors learn 
about restatements from other sources and on different dates. Second, the use of cumulative 
abnormal returns was avoided in the analysis, which measures changes in a stock’s price relative 
to changes in a market metric, such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the S&P 500. The 
research performed focused specifically on changes in stock price with the expectation that 
stocks would unilaterally react adversely to restatement information. However, it’s possible that 
even though some stocks still experienced positive movement between -1 and +2, the movement 
was less positive than the movement experienced by the overall market. This would illustrate a 
negative market reaction even if the sampled stock price continued to rise, so long as it increased 
at a lesser rate than the market rate. Third, it’s possible that the markets simply don’t place the 
same level of emphasis on restatements as expected. Maybe a 2.3% average decrease in stock 
price is considered a normal and expected reaction to restatement information for investors, 
although an accounting student or academic would have preferred to see a larger reaction given 
the potential implications of restatements. A possible study for a future scholar might analyze 
cumulative differences between restatement filing announcements and earnings announcements 
which fail to meet analysts’ expectations, which might confirm the notion that investors place 
significantly more emphasis on earnings than accounting issues. And finally, the small sample 
16 
 
sizes could be distorting the information. While the restating companies with highest net assets 
were chosen expecting a more severe market reaction, it’s possible that asset size was not the 
best measurement on which to skew the data set. Results also could have been unevenly 
distributed throughout the thousands of restatements found in the total population.  
 The data presented in Table 2 technically supports H1. Markets did react negatively to 
restatements filed after the 2008 Financial Crisis and the passing of the Dodd Frank Act of 2010, 
although the market did not react as negatively as anticipated. An analysis of cumulative 
abnormal returns may have yielded more evidence showing that this overall reaction is 
intentional, and not merely incidental. Interestingly, the data also rejects H2. Markets actually 
reacted more strongly to restatement information in the Post-Dodd Frank period than the Post-
Sarbanes Oxley period. It’s possible that, through continued education and awareness, investors 
have become better identifiers of restatement information, and therefore place more emphasis on 
it depending on its characteristics. Another potential cause for this result might be a change in 
market concerns. As Table 1 already indicated, only one restatement per sample was the result of 
fraudulent activity. However, it’s possible that investors reacted most substantially to fraud 
restatements following Sarbanes-Oxley, as fraud was the primary catalyst behind the creation of 
SOX. Now, as the issues surrounding Sarbanes Oxley have become more regulated and 
controllable, it’s possible that investors have begun to pay more attention to all restatements 
rather than just fraud-related restatements. This will be analyzed further within the regression 
analysis. But as internal controls have increasingly become an important basis for discussion, it’s 
possible that markets are reacting to accidental restatements with even more scrutiny than before. 
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    Table 2: Aggregated Market Reactions to Restatement Filings                     
Reaction Measured as the Sum of % Change in Stock Price between -1 and +2 
Post-SOX Post-Dodd Frank 
TICKER % Change in Price TICKER % Change in Price 
MTU -0.0079 JPM 0.0296 
MTU -0.0244 MS -0.0676 
JPM -0.0048 AEG 0.0286 
BAC 0.0260 MFC -0.0167 
MTF -0.0244 AV -0.0414 
PRU 0.0137 PNC 0.0013 
GE -0.0385 SHG -0.0094 
GE -0.0004 HIG 0.0228 
MER -0.0610 LNC 0.0004 
AIG 0.0426 PFG 0.0089 
AIG 0.0210 SLF -0.0389 
SBP 0.0342 HMC 0.0445 
BP 0.0098 HMC 0.0048 
BLK -0.0614 NBG -0.2207 
PFG -0.0257 JNJ -0.0020 
AAPL 0.0357 COP -0.0037 
F 0.0182 GNW 0.0388 
F 0.0598 CHU -0.0507 
RD -0.0275 CAT 0.0535 
DCX -0.0014 EBR -0.0251 
SLM -0.0195 SAN -0.0614 
STO -0.0574 KMI 0.0065 
SI 0.0008 DOW -0.0263 
NBG 0.0542 EC -0.0278 
FITB -0.0139 ZION -0.0085 
NVS -0.0006 ESRX -0.1291 
DUK -0.0285 VE -0.1027 
NFS -0.0253 TMUS -0.0768 
ACE -0.0045 LUK 0.0042 
    CIT 0.0031 
    CIT 0.0164 
    CIT -0.0016 
    CIT -0.0124 
    EMC 0.0186 
    CHK -0.1461 
Average % Change -0.0038 Average % Change -0.0225 
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 Table 3 presents the analysis of the regression model run on the two sampled time 
periods. From the 50 restatement instances gathered and used for Table 1, all instances of private 
corporations from the regression were unfortunately removed, as stock data was not available for 
these companies. The resulting samples for the regression model consist of 29 instances for the 
Post-SOX period and 35 instances for the Post-Dodd Frank period. Both regressions were run in 
Excel. The data poses some interesting results. The estimates for each independent variable, or 
coefficients, indicate the rate of change of the output given a rate of change in that variable; in 
other words, it’s a measure of correlation within the linear regression formula. Some expected 
relationships within both samples were identified. For instance, negative restatement filings, SEC 
investigations, and larger net assets yield negative relationships with stock price movement for 
both time periods, and fraud indicators within the Post-Dodd Frank sample resulted in a negative 
market reaction. However, FRAUD in the Post-SOX sample indicates a positive relationship 
with market price, which is concerning, and CORE restatements only yielded a negative 
relationship in the Post-SOX sample. Some of these findings can once again be attributed to 
some of the limitations previously mentioned, among them the very small sample size. 
Additionally worrisome is the fact that RESTDAYS appears to be the only statistically 
significant independent variable at the 10% level within the regression model. Scatterplots have 
been provided for only RESTDAYS for this reason, which still shows a significant degree of 
variability and virtually no distinguishable pattern. The adjusted R-Squared for each model, 
which is a goodness of fit test which measures how well the regression line approximates the 
data points and adjusted for the number of explanatory terms, is extremely low. The first 
sample’s regression line can approximate 38.5% of the data, while the second sample can only 
approximate for a mere 8.3%. This drop in the data’s ability to explain movement is especially 
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surprising, considering the sample size is slightly larger for the second regression model. 
Additionally, neither model is statistically significant, although the Post-SOX model is much 
closer to being statistically significant than the Post-Dodd Frank model. An explanation or 
indication of why both models failed to achieve higher R-Squared values, or why neither 
demonstrates statistical significance, cannot be found.  
 
 
Table 3: Regression on Individual Time Periods                                                                                   
Dependent Variable is Cumulative Change in Stock Price (-1,0,+1,+2) 
  Post-SOX Post-Dodd Frank 
Variable Estimate Std Err t-value Prob of t Estimate Std Err t-value Prob of t 
Intercept 0.15051 0.14125 1.06551 0.29874 0.03047 0.29575 0.10303 0.91870 
FRAUD 0.03289 0.04667 0.70474 0.48872 -0.08460 0.06330 -1.33645 0.19256 
CORE -0.03300 0.01944 -1.69787 0.10430 0.03350 0.02436 1.37519 0.18038 
NEG -0.01552 0.01470 -1.05553 0.30318 -0.01054 0.02854 -0.36937 0.71474 
NUMFAIL 0.00406 0.00318 1.27611 0.21585 -0.00706 0.00503 -1.40554 0.17126 
RESTDAYS 0.00003 0.00001 3.80465 0.00104 -0.00005 0.00003 -1.80103 0.08288 
SEC -0.02506 0.01687 -1.48500 0.15240 -0.04182 0.05726 -0.73044 0.47141 
ASSETS -0.00695 0.00543 -1.28114 0.21411 -0.00020 0.01147 -0.01769 0.98601 
  N 29 N 35 
  MODEL F-VALUE 3.501 MODEL F-VALUE 1.437 
  SIGNIFICANCE 0.012 SIGNIFICANCE 0.232 
  ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.385 ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.083 
Bold indicates statistical significance at the 10% level or better. 
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 Table 4 further expands on the regression analysis by combining all independent 
variables from the two samples to create one regression model. The purpose of presenting the 
results of all interactions is to determine if any statistically significant differences exist between 
the two regressions presented in Table 3. Parallel to what Table 3 illustrated, NEG, SEC, and 
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ASSETS realize a negative market response for both samples, and the RESTDAYS variable 
remains statistically significant. Unlike Table 3, however, Dodd FRAUD, Dodd CORE, and 
Dodd NUMFAIL have developed some statistical significance at the 10% level as well. The 
Adjusted R-Squared remains very low for the combined model presented in Table 4. Only 
around 16.5% of the change in stock price between the two time periods can be explained by 
relationships among the independent variables. Additionally, the model overall fails to achieve 
statistical significance at the 10% level.  
 Tables 3 and 4 can be analyzed to draw inferences about H3. H3, which was used to 
determine if market returns for restatements of core earnings will be more negative than 
restatements not related to revenue recognition or operating expenses in the post-financial crisis 
period, has not been supported. In fact, restatements of core earnings in the Post-Dodd Frank 
sample had a positive effect on market returns, which simply should not be the case. Again, the 
issue might come down to the skewing of the data, the very small sample size, or the lack of a 
measurement against market returns to develop cumulative abnormal returns instead of the 
isolated view of changes in stock’s price. What’s interesting is that the Post-SOX period does 
experience an adverse market reaction to core restatements, while the Post-Dodd Frank period 
does not. The information from Table 2 seems to indicate that markets react more negatively to 
restatements overall in the Post-Dodd Frank period, suggesting greater knowledge or emphasis in 
the area of restatements. However, the fact that the notification of a core restatement no longer 
yields a negative market reaction seems to advocate otherwise. Perhaps other variables played a 
greater role in influencing overall market reaction during the period following the Financial 
Crisis.  
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Table 4: Regression With All Possible Interactions                                               
Dependent Variable is Cumulative Change in Stock Price (-1,0,+1,+2) 
Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Prob of t 
Intercept 0.08832 0.17078 0.51716 0.60737 
SOX FRAUD 0.03280 0.08128 0.40361 0.68826 
SOX CORE -0.02885 0.03172 -0.90950 0.36754 
SOX NEG -0.01476 0.02551 -0.57844 0.56561 
SOX NUMFAIL 0.00371 0.00545 0.68014 0.49962 
SOX RESTDAYS 0.00003 0.00001 2.15884 0.03579 
SOX SEC -0.02433 0.02932 -0.83004 0.41054 
SOX ASSETS -0.00459 0.00663 -0.69205 0.49217 
Dodd FRAUD -0.08729 0.05020 -1.73872 0.08836 
Dodd CORE 0.03448 0.01934 1.78277 0.08082 
Dodd NEG -0.00934 0.02264 -0.41250 0.68177 
Dodd NUMFAIL -0.00747 0.00386 -1.93695 0.05853 
Dodd RESTDAYS -0.00005 0.00002 -2.38785 0.02085 
Dodd SEC -0.04366 0.04564 -0.95664 0.34345 
Dodd ASSETS -0.00243 0.00666 -0.36570 0.71616 
MODEL F-VALUE 1.888 
SIGNIFICANCE 0.052 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.165 
Bold indicates statistical significance at the 10% level or higher. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this paper was to determine if financial markets reacted any differently to 
restatements announced in a period following the accounting scandals leading to the Sarbanes-
Oxley in 2002 than restatements announced in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
Through various mathematical analyses, it can be concluded that although markets did in fact 
react differently and overall more strongly to financial statement restatement information, some 
of the relationships did not react in an expected manner. The two samples yielded an overall 
difference of about 1.9% change in stock price decrease between -1 days and +2 days of the 
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restatement filing. However, the Post-SOX sample only showed an average .38% decrease in 
stock price over the course of the four days analyzed. The regression analysis shifted focus 
toward the independent variables themselves and how they influenced stock price between the 
two samples. Some of the relationships were expected, such as the negative relationship between 
NEG, SEC, and ASSETS across all samples, but it was surprising to see the one company with a 
fraud related restatement in the Post-SOX sample experience positive market returns surrounding 
the date of filing. In the Post-Dodd Frank sample, markets reacted more negatively to FRAUD, 
NUMFAIL, RESTDAYS and SEC, and less negatively to such important variables as CORE. 
Overall, the models possessed very little statistical significance, indicating a substantial degree of 
noise with the variables selected, or possibly that the variables selected simply do not do a very 
good job of explaining movement in stock price surrounding the release of restatement 
information.  
 It’s difficult to interpret the meaning behind these results without further study and 
analysis. While the generally stronger market reaction to restatement filings in the Post-Dodd 
Frank period should indicate an increased awareness and emphasis on restatements with regards 
to stock value, the variables selected do not successfully explain why this increased awareness 
and emphasis exists.  
 While the analysis did not conclude in an anticipated manner, it has still provided a 
valuable contribution to the accounting literature. As stated previously, it has been difficult to 
find any accounting research related to post-financial crisis markets. Perhaps this is because 
accounting scholars did not deem such analysis necessary, as the Financial Crisis was primarily 
economics and finance related. The results of the analysis perhaps lend some credence to this 
viewpoint. However, it’s important to continue analyzing various accounting issues, especially 
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those related to fraud and market awareness, regardless of the time period or any extraordinary 
events that may have preceded it. The accounting profession must remain committed to fair, 
accurate, and timely reporting of financial information to the public, and accountants must play a 
role in continuing to educate investors, maintaining a marketplace free from fraudulent activity, 
and improving the skills of workers so that restatements may become a less frequent occurrence.  
 Future scholars looking to expand upon the ideas presented in this paper should increase 
sample size by a considerable margin. It was damaging to the research to have only had one 
restatement per sample related to fraud, and relatively few SEC restatements as well. Overall, all 
of the variables could have benefitted from a larger sample size. Choosing another metric for 
sample selection other than sample size would also be suggested. While only around 10 
restatements in the entire population of thousands of restatements (for the Post-Dodd Frank 
sample in particular) were related to fraud, it would be interesting to see how these 10 instances 
of fraudulent restatements interacted with the underlying stock price information. The use of 
cumulative abnormal return information might also be recommended, instead of cumulative 
percentage change in stock price over a time period, which is what the analysis used. Sierra, 
Lovata, and Jategaonkar used CARs in their analysis of restatement reactions, and their models 
seem to have more statistical significance than the model presented in this paper, perhaps in part 
due to this reason. It would also benefit the research to expand the number of independent 
variables to pick up some correlations that may have been completely missed altogether.  
 The research has demonstrated the complexity of mathematical data analysis. Even with 
significant variables that realistically would have a substantial impact on stock price movement, 
the model was unable to account for even half of the total market reactions included in the 
sample. The research also encourages one to think critically about the implications of data. While 
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it’s difficult to explain with mathematical accuracy why some fraudulent restatements yielded 
positive market reactions surrounding the announcement date, it was important to think about 
some underlying external factors that could have caused variations from the expected output. It 
was also critical to learn the importance of not taking the lack of significant findings as a bad 
sign. It could simply be an indication that the hypotheses presented are not fully supported given 
the data set and variables provided.  
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